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MULTIPLE-STATE ESTATES UNDER
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
ALLAN D. VESTAL*
I. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
On August 7, 1969, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws adopted by a vote of the states the Uniform Pro-
bate Code. The following week the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association approved the Code.' In these actions a giant step
forward was taken toward uniformity in probate law in the United
States. Although no state has had the opportunity to consider and
adopt the Uniform Code, there is reason to believe that a number of
states will give serious consideration to the Code in the near future.
For some time in the post World War II period various segments
of the legal profession and the lay public had been dissatisfied with the
methods of passing property from one generation to another.2 This had
resulted in a number of probate revisions which have taken place or
which have been urged.3 In the decade of the sixties impetus for re-
*John F. Murray Professor of Law, University of Iowa. A.B. 1943, DePauw Uni-
versity; L.L.B. 1949, Yale University. The author is one of the draftsmen of the
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE and a member of the Special Committee on the UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE Of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. The author cannot speak for the draftsmen, the committee or the National
Conference. Any opinions are his own and should not be attributed to anyone else.
'The House of Delegates approved the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE with an amend-
ment which provides:
Resolved, that the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
be authorized to present the views of the American Bar Association regard-
ing the Uniform Probate Code with appropriate recommendations for
implementation to state and local Bar Associations to make in-depth
studies, including studies of the long-term advantages of uniformity on
particular points of probate and related law, customs and practices; and
that the National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws be urged to continue its Special Drafting Committee.
After the adoption of the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (hereinafter cited as UPC)
by the National Conference and its approval by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association, a version of the UPC was published by Prentice-Hall
under the date of August 27, 1969. In a letter from the Executive Secretary to
the Commissioners it was stated:
This edition of the Code was printed by Prentice-Hall, Inc., and con-
tains the changes made at Dallas.
However, it does not contain style changes which will appear in the
official draft of the Uniform Probate Code.
2See M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAwYERs, ch. 11 (1968); Let's Rewrite
the Probate Laws, CHANGING Tiars, Jan. 1969, at 39.
For example, the IowA PROBATE CODE was revised by a committee of the Iowa
Bar Association and submitted to the Iowa General Assembly in 1963. IOwA CODE
ch. 63 (1966). This was adopted almost without change by the legislature and
became effective on January 1, 1964. On the new IOWA PROBATE CODE, see Sym-
posium on the New Iowa Probate Code, 49 IowA L. REv. 633 (1964) with forward
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form has come from Wisconsin, Michigan, Oregon, Alabama, Mary-
land and other states. In the early ig6o's the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (hereinafter the National Con-
ference) and the Real Property, Probate and Trust Section of the
American Bar Association both became actively interested in the mat-
ter of probate reform.4
In August, 1963, a joint meeting was held of the Model Probate
Code Special Committee of the National Conference and members of
the Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the ABA. 5
At this meeting the preliminary efforts of these two groups were merged
into a common project, a "joint venture," "the development of a
Model Probate Code." 6 Following this meeting in 1963, a group of
reporters started work on drafting a code dealing with probate and
related matters. At the Hollywood, Florida, meeting of the National
Conference in August of 1965, a draft of part of the Code was pre-
sented for the first time. Following this beginning the personnel work-
ing on the project has changed,7 the title of the project has changed,8
by Willard L. Boyd (early draftsman of the UPC), and articles by Shirley A.
Webster, Jack W. Peters, Matthew J. Heartney, Jr. and N. William Hines.
For a discussion of 1965 changes in New York probate law see Note, Recent
Reforms in the Law of Estates, Wills and Trusts, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 230 (1966).
'The Conference has been interested in estate administration for a number
of years as indicated by the uniform acts passed in the area. The UNFon FOREIGN
PROBATED WiLLs ACT was approved in 1915 (withdrawn); the MODE.L EXECUTION
or Wims ACT was drafted in 194o; the UNIFORM POwERs OF FOREIGN REPRESENTA-
TIEs AcT was approved in 1944; the UNIFORI ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
Acr was approved in 1949; the UNIFORM PROBATE OF FOREIGN WiLLs ACr was
approved in i95o; and the MODEL SMALL ESTATES Acr was approved in 1951.
GThis meeting was held in the Hotel Knickerbocker, Chicago, Illinois, during
the 7 2d Annual Conference of the National Commissioners. Representing the ABA
were J. Pennington Straus, Edward B. Winn, Harrison Durand, Paul Basye and
William Fratcher (the latter two later became reporters on the UPC). Represent-
ing the National Conference were Allison Dunham, Earl Sachse, Clarke Gravel,
Harvey S. Reynolds, Clarence Swainson, William Pierce, Herbert H. McAdams and
Sverre Roang.
O'This language is taken from -the notes of the meeting and is attributed to
Clarke Gravel, Chairman of the 1962-63 Model Probate Committee of the National
Conference.
7The original chairman of the National Conference Committee was Judge
Sverre Roang, of Janesville, Wisconsin, who was not renamed a Commissioner in
1967. In the Hawaii meeting Tom Martin Davis of Houston, Texas, and Charles
Horowitz, of Seattle, Washington, were named co-chairmen of the Committee.
During the crucial year, 1968-69, the members of this Special Committee on the
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE were Fred T. Hanson (Nebraska), James T. Harrison
(Montana), Thomas L. Jones (Alabama), Robert A. Lucas (Indiana), Miller Manier
(Tennessee), Bert McElroy (Oklahoma), Godfrey L. Munter (D.C.), J. William
O'Brien (Vermont), Russell W. Smith (Indiana), Clarence A. Swainson (Wyoming),
C. P. Von Herzen (California), Joe W. Worley (Tennessee), Robert R. Wright
(Arkansas), and the author of this article.
'he initial discussion was in terms of a "Model" Code. Later the goal became
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and the scope of the project has been modified, 9 but the principal
thrust has remained the same-the creation of simplified methods of
transferring property on death and protecting the interests of certain
legally incompetent persons. A great impetus to the development of
the Code was given by a meeting of the draftsmen in 1967 at Boulder,
Colorado.10 During a five week session the draftsmen put together
the so-called "Boulder Draft" which was the first extensive, cohesive
draft covering all of the articles then proposed. A session of three
draftsmen was held in Berkeley the following year and Article VII on
trusts was produced in this meeting." This is the background of the
adoption of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) in Dallas in 1969.
The UPC is composed of seven articles dealing with various phases
of the very broad topic of estates of both decedents and persons under
disability in addition to coverage of some non-probate transfers and
trusts. Article I, General Provisions, covers the application of the act,
definitions, the probate court itself, a general notice provision, right
to trial by jury, and a broad fraud provision. Article II provides for in-
testate succession and wills. This includes elective share of the surviv-
ing spouse, pretermitted heirs, exempt property and allowances, rules
of construction for wills, and contractual arrangements concerning
death. This article in a bracketed section also deals with the effects of
homicide on succession to property.
Article III covers the probate of wills and the administration of
estates, either through supervised or independent administration. Parts
of Article III deal with appointment proceedings, the personal rep-
a Uniform Act. To the National Conference the difference is very significant. For
a discussion of the distinction between a "Model" Act and a "Uniform" Act see
HMANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws 328 (1968). Basically the "Uniform" Act has widespread support among the
commissioners and is expected to have a good chance of enactment in a sub-
stantial number of jurisdictions.
9The addition of the Article on Trusts in 1968 was the most notable change.
"Attending the seminar in Boulder, Colorado, were draftsmen Paul E. Basye,
Hastings College of the Law of the University of California, Richard Effland, now
of the College of Law of Arizona State University, William F. Fratcher, School of
Law, University of Missouri, James McDonald, Law School of University of Wis-
consin, Eugene Scoles, now Dean of the School of Law, University of Oregon,
Richard V. Wellman, Law School of the University of Michigan, Harold G. Wren,
Law School of Boston College, and the author. Observers at the meeting were
Thomas L. Jones of the Law School, University of Alabama (later named a Com-
missioner and a member of the Special Committee on the UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE) and Thomas W. Mapp, School of Law, University of Oregon.
"The three men attending this meeting were Edward Halbach, Dean of the
School of Law, University of California at Berkeley, Gene Scoles, now Dean of
the School of Law, University of Oregon, and Richard Wellman, Law School of
the University of Michigan.
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resentative and his duties and powers, claims of creditors, distribution,
and closing. The article also includes a provision for handling small
estates.
Article IV covers the matters under consideration in this article,
foreign personal representatives and ancillary administration.
Article V deals with the protection of persons under disability and
their property. Article VI, on non-probate transfers, covers multiple-
party accounts and provisions in contracts dealing with the effect of
death. The final article, VII, deals with the administration of trusts.
Although there is some interrelationship between articles, they gener-
ally can stand alone.12
The Uniform Probate Code was designed to remedy some of the
deficiencies so readily apparent in the present scheme of property
passage by probate administration. It may be true that the Code goes
to extremes in attempting to solve some of the problems, but none-
theless radical steps seemed to be necessary. The National Conference
has prepared a comprehensive document which deserves serious con-
sideration by all members of the legal profession.
2. FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES; ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION
Article IV deals with estates which involve more than a single
state.' 3 Generally, this involves the domiciliary jurisdiction 14 and a
second state in which the decedent had property or in which a claim
is asserted against the estate. Obviously more than two states can be
involved. The multi-state contacts can arise in numerous ways. The
retired Iowa farmer, who keeps his farm but moves to Florida and
decides to reside there, may have property in both Iowa and Florida
on death. The Illinois businessman, who decides to invest in a savings
12In the latter stages of drafting there has been some pressure to separate
some articles out for special treatment as model rather -than uniform provisions.
To the members of the N.C.C.U.S.L. this difference is very significant. The uniform
laws have much more status or prestige. See note 8 supra.
"3For a general discussion of the current state of the law on suits by and
against foreign personal representatives see Currie, The Multiple Personality of
the Dead: Executors, Administrators, and the Conflict of Laws, 33 U. CHi. L. REv.
429 (1966).
lAThe UPC in section 3-202 provides for the situation where there is a conflict
concerning the state of domicile. The final sentence states, "The determination of
domicile in the proceeding first commenced must be accepted as determinative in
the proceeding in this state." Since this is keyed to the action first commenced and
not to the first judgment handed down, there may be some constitutional problem
concerning full faith and credit. See also Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 Us.
343 (1942) (determination of domicile not entitled to full faith and credit as to
those not parties to prior determination).
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and loan association in California, on death will have a multi-state
estate. If a Kansas motorist, killed in an automobile accident in
Missouri, is at fault, his personal representative handling his estate in
Kansas may find that he is involved in litigation in Missouri.1 5 The
Montana resident who invests in land in Arizona has a multi-state
estate on death. All of these hypotheticals are commonplace; the
American population is no longer tied to its place of birth. People are
mobile; wealth is mobile.
Whenever more than one state is involved, administration at the
present time is complex and difficult. Assembling assets from several
states is not easy. While jurisdictions increase arithmetically, difficulties
seem to increase geometrically. Just as troublesome is the possibility
that the personal representative or the assets of the estate may be the
subject of litigation in several states.
Article IV is designed to simplify and unify the estate administra-
tion. It may have some other collateral effects, but the main thrust is
toward these goals.
3. MARSHALLING ASSETS OF ESTATE; COLLECTING DEBTS OR
PROPERTY OWED TO DECEDENT
One of the recurring problems in estate administration is collect-
ing debts and property of a decedent outside the domiciliary jurisdic-
tion. An example of this difficulty is found when the decedent has
deposited money in a savings and loan association in a foreign state.
The personal representative is forced to go to the foreign state to get
this asset. Should the savings and loan association be willing to pay
without court proceedings, this does not necessarily solve the difficulty
completely. There remains the possibility that payment may not ter-
minate liability.
The courts of a number of states have held that the personal rep-
resentative appointed by the foreign, domiciliary court 16 may ac-
2Brooks v. National Bank of Topeka, 251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1958) (Kansas
executor sued in federal court in Missouri by Florida residents). Note, Should
Iowa Again "Reach Out" for Estate Representatives of Non-resident Motorists?,
44 IOWA L. REV. 402 (1959); Note, Amenability of Foreign Administrators to Suit
Under Non-Resident Motorist Statutes, 57 YALE L.J. 647 (1948).
"Although there may be some confusion about the terminology, it seems rea-
sonable to separate probate courts in a given estate into a domiciliary court (in
the state where the decedent was domiciled) and ancillary courts (all other states).
In re Maxton's Estate, 335 Ill. App. 240, 81 N.E.2d 658 (1948); First Nat'l Bank v.
Blessing, 231 Mo. App. 288, 98 S.W.2d 149 (1936); In re Smith's Estate, 126 Mont.
558, 255 P.2d 687 (1953); In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677 (194o). A
court may be ancillary although there has been no domiciliary administration.
Payne v. Payne, 239 Ky. 99, 39 S.W.2d 205 (1931).
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cept voluntary payment and give acquittance so long as no local
creditors are prejudiced. For example, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire has stated,
By comity, in the absence of the appointment of an ancillary
administrator in this state, a foreign administrator may collect
the assets of the estate located here when there is no prejudice
to local interests .... If there is need, any creditors may peti-
tion for ancillary administration in this state.17
Minnesota,'3 California,' 9 Connecticut, 20 New York 2' and Delaware22
have reached similar conclusions. The Maryland court has stated,
"[T]he general current of the decisions has held that such voluntary
payment is valid, and a good discharge of the debt."23
Colorado and Florida have statutes covering this matter. Condi-
tioned on "no prior written demand from a creditor" and a delay of
six months, the Colorado statute protects a debtor of the estate by pro-
viding: "Upon such payment or delivery, such person is released to
the same extent as if payment or delivery had been made to a per-
sonal representative appointed by a court of this state."24 The Florida
statute, along this same line, provides,
All persons indebted to the estate of a decedent or having posses-
sion of personal property, either tangible or intangible, belong-
ing to the estate of a decedent, who have received no written de-
mand from a personal representative or curator appointed in
this state, for payment of such indebtedness or the delivery of
such property, are authorized to make payment of such indebt-
edness or to deliver such personal property to the foreign per-
sonal representative after the expiration of three months from
the date of his appointment.2 5
17Swann v. Bill, 95 N.H. 158, 161, 59 A.2d 346, 348 (1948). See also Wolfe v.
Bank of Anderson, 123 S.C. 208, 212, 116 S.E. 451, 452 (1923).
"Dexter v. Berge, 76 Minn. 216, 220, 78 N.W. 1111, 1113 (1899) held that a
foreign executor had -the authority to receive a voluntary payment of indebtedness
even without complying with a statute which preceded MINN. STAT. § 525.273
(1965) (providing that a foreign representative may collect debts after filing
authenticated copy of his letter at office of local register of deeds).
"See, e.g., Fishback v. J. C. Forkner Fig Gardens, Inc., 218 Cal. 401, 402, 23
P.2d 293 (1933); In re Rawitzer's Estate, 175 Cal. 585, 587, 166 P. 581, 582 (1917);
Winbigler v. Shattuck, 5o Cal. App. 562, 563, 195 P. 707, 708 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920).
mSee Selleck v. Rusco, 46 Conn. 370, 372 (1878).
nMass v. German Say. Bank, 176 N.Y. 377, 68 N.E. 658 (1903); Schluter v.
Bowery Say. Bank, 117 N.Y. 125, 22 N.E. 572 (1889); Parson v. Lyman, 2o N.Y.
103 (1859).
"See Bowles v. R. G. Dun-Bradstreet Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 32, 42, 12 A.2d 892,
396 (1940).
3Gitizens Nat'l Bank v. Sharp, 53 Md. 521, 529 (1880).
14
CoLo. R v. STAT. ANN. § 153-6-9 (1963).
,5FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.30 (1963).
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Florida also has a parallel statute dealing with bank accounts of non-
resident decedents.
26
Section 4-2o of the UPC is similar to the Colorado and Florida
statutes in allowing voluntary payment. It provides that the personal
representative from the domiciliary jurisdiction can, after the death of
the decedent, contact
any person indebted to the estate of a ... decedent or having
possession or control of personal property, or of an instrument
evidencing a debt, obligation, stock or chose in action belong-
ing to the estate of the ... decedent ....
and ask for payment or delivery.27 The personal representative is to
present an affidavit stating:
(i) the date of the death of the nonresident decedent,
(2) that no local administration, or application or petition
therefor, is pending in this state,
(3) that the domiciliary foreign personal representative is en-
titled to payment or delivery.2
8
Upon the presentation of this affidavit, the debtor or person in posses-
sion, if he acts in good faith, can pay or deliver to the domiciliary per-
sonal representative and will be discharged of his obligation.29 This
simplifies the handling of debts or assets in a non-domiciliary juris-
diction. At the present time in many states these can be handled with
protection to the delivering party only through the opening of an
ancillary administration.3 0
Under this section of the UPC the debtor of the estate is not re-
quired to make payment. If he wishes, he can refuse to pay and force
the foreign personal representative to use other techniques available to
him to collect the debt. This section does not cover the matter of
transfer of securities since, it is felt, this "is adequately covered by
section 3 of the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security
Transfers."31
There is one apparent danger in the UPC provision. A resident
creditor of the nonresident decedent may wish to look for satisfaction
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 654.04 (1966).
2TUNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 4-201.
281d.
2Id. § 4-202.
s'See, e.g., Robinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 F.2d 613, 614 (N.D. Tex. 193o),
afJ'd, 55 F.2d 2o9 (5 th Cir. 1932); Noel v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 147 F. Supp.
432, 433 (D. Conn. 1956); Jones v. Turner, 249 Mich. 403, 408-09, 228 N.W. 796, 798
(1930).
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 4-201, Comment.
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to the assets of the decedent located in the local state. He may not want
the assets carried back to the domiciliary jurisdiction. Article IV pro-
vides that such a resident creditor may notify "the debtor . . . or the
person having possession of the [decedent's] personal property" that the
assets should not be delivered to a foreign personal representative.
When such notice has been given, payment or delivery may not be
made under section 4-2o.32 This provision is similar to the Colorado
provision33 and reflects the desire found in other states to protect local
creditors of the decedent.3 4
4. FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE ACTING AS LOCAL PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE WITH ALL PowEas
Under the existing law of a number of states, the foreign personal
representative has the power to maintain actions to recover debts
owed to the decedent. 35 For example, the Kansas statute provides:
A fiduciary duly appointed in any other state or country may sue
or be sued in any court in this state, in his capacity of fiduciary,
in like manner and under like restrictions as a nonresident
may sue or be sued.3 6
Other states have similar provisions.37 This power to sue may be given
to the foreign personal representative only after he has met certain
local requirements. In Indiana he is authorized to file a duly authenti-
cated copy of his letters and give a bond "under the laws regulating
the maintaining of suits by non-resident citizens."38 In Arkansas he is
required to file a bond.3 9
3,See Id. § 4-203.
"See CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-6-9 (1963).
m3See, e.g., GA. CoDm ANN. § 113-2404 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-130 (RKepl.
Vol. 1968).
wSee Note, The Extraterritorial Authority of Executors and Administrators to
Sue and Collect Assets, 52 IowA L. Rv. 290, 292-98 (1966) (analysis of state
statutory authorization of foreign personal representatives to sue).
30KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1708 (1964).
37See, e.g., RLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.30 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-2401 (1959);
N.Y. DEcED. ESr. LAW § i6o (McKinney Supp. 1966). See also Note, supra note 35, at
297-98.
nI[ND. ANN. STAT. § 7-753 (Repl. Vol. 1953). A foreign personal representative
may be allowed to sue in Indiana without producing a copy of his letters unless
his capacity is challenged. Upton v. Adams' Executors, 27 Ind. 432 (1867). A
foreign personal representative cannot sue on a note when ancillary administration
has been granted. Hensley v. Rich, 191 Ind. 294, 132 N.E. 632 (1921).
'ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-805 (Supp. 1965). For cases interpreting this and its
progenitor see McGraw v. Simpson, 208 Ark. 471, 187 S.W.2d 536 (1945); St. Louis,
I.M. & S. Ry. v. Cleere, 76 Ark. 377, 88 S.W. 995 (i9o5); Gibson v. Ponder, 40 Ark.
195 (1882).
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The Conference chose to incorporate a provision in the UPC
granting broad power to a domiciliary personal representative who
files certain documents in the local state. Under section 4-204, if no
local administration is pending, the foreign personal representative
can file with the local court in a county in which the deceased had
property (I) authenticated copies of his appointment, and (2) copies
of his official bond if he has given one.40 Upon filing these documents,
the foreign personal representative may exercise "all powers of a local
personal representative, and may maintain actions and proceedings in
[the local state] subject to any conditions imposed upon nonresident
suitors generally." 41
The grant of "all powers of a local personal representative" to the
foreign personal representative means that the foreign personal rep-
resentative "has the same power over the title to property of the estate
as an absolute owner would have ... ." This power of the personal
representative "may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of
court." The property, of course, is held in trust for the benefit of the
creditors and other individuals having an interest in the estate.
42
Equating the foreign personal representative with the local personal
representative also means that the former may have the power to "re-
ceive assets from fiduciaries, or other sources," 43 and "prosecute or
defend claims, or proceedings . . . for the protection of the estate
"44
The Uniform Probate Code provides that the powers under sec-
tions 4-201 and 4-205 "shall be exercised only when there is no ad-
ministration or application therefor pending in this state."45 An appli-
cation for ancillary administration terminates powers under the two
sections to collect assets of the decedent and to exercise the powers of a
local personal representative. However, "the local Court may allow the
foreign personal representative to exercise limited powers to preserve
the estate." 46 When a local personal representative is named, he then
is "subject to all duties and obligations which have accrued by virtue
of the exercise of the powers by the foreign personal representative and
4°For examples of similar filing requirements see GA. CODE ANN. § 113-2403
(1959); KY. R y. STAT. § 395.170 (1969); MINN. STAT. § 525.273 (1961); MMs.
CODE ANN. § 622 (1957); N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAw § 16o (McKinney Supp. 1966); NJ).
CENT. CODE § 35-01-25 (1960). For other examples of similar bond requirements
see ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 151 (1958); Ky. REv. STAT. § 395.170 (1969).








may be substituted for him in any action or proceedings in this state." 47
This continuity in administration reflects the underlying policy of
unifying estate administration which is found in the UPC.
Since there may be some confusion about the powers in this period
of transition, the UPC protects a relying party by providing that
No person who before receiving actual notice of a pending local
administration has changed his position by relying on the
powers of a foreign personal representative shall be prejudiced




Another method of dealing with the assets of a nonresident dece-
dent, provided in the Uniform Probate Code, is ancillary administra-
tion.
Under the UPC the appointment of a personal representative can
be sought first by persons given priority. These include:
(i) the person with priority as determined by a probated will in-
cluding a person nominated by a power conferred in a will;
(2) the surviving spouse who is a devisee of the decedent;
(3) other devisees of the decedent;
(4) the surviving spouse of the decedent;
(5) other heirs of the decedent;
(6) 45 days after the death of the decedent, any creditor.49
It is clear that persons without priority may seek the appointment of a
personal representative although only in a formal proceeding.50 Should
appointment be sought, then the local court must, if there are local
assets of the decedent, appoint a personal representative and so open
an ancillary administration of the estate. This ancillary administration
will be instituted even though there is a domiciliary personal repre-
sentative who has filed authenticated copies of his appointment and of
his bond, if any.51 This ancillary administration will probably be
sought by someone other than the domiciliary personal representative




rmId. § 3-203(e). Formal proceedings are judicial and are covered by Article III,
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without going through the procedures of informal or formal appoint-
ment.
5 2
A non-domiciliary administration may be had where there is no ad-
ministration in the place of domicile of the decedent. It is possible that
a decedent might die with all of his assets outside his state of domicile
or under circumstances so that there would be no administration at
his place of domicile. This might happen, for example, in the case of
an Iowa farmer who decided to retire to Florida. He might have a farm
and equipment in Iowa-the bulk of his wealth-while his residence is
in Florida. On death there might not be an administration in Florida,
his place of residence, while there might be an administration in Iowa.
This latter would be an ancillary, not domiciliary, administration.
53
Ancillary administration under the UPC follows the general pat-
tern of administration under Article III. There are, however, some
points of difference. In an original administration there is a three year
period of time within which the appointment of the personal rep-
resentative must take place. This statute of limitation does not apply if
there has been a prior appointment. If a personal representative has
been appointed in one state, then additional appointments are possible
under the UPC even though the three year period has run.5 4
The proper venue for the appointment of a personal representative
is the place of domicile of the decedent. In the case of a non-resident
there is no place of domicile in the state and the Code provides that
the proper venue for an ancillary appointment is "any [county] where
property of the decedent was located at the time of his death." 55 To
solve some of the problems concerning the location of property, sub-
section (d) establishes some rules. It provides:
A debt, other than one evidenced by investment or commercial
paper or other instrument in favor of a non-domiciliary is lo-
cated where the debtor resides or, if the debtor is a person other
than an individual, at the place where it has its principal office.
Commercial paper, investment paper and other instruments are
located where the instrument is. An interest in property held in
trust is located where the trustee may be sued.56
mId. § 4-2o5. A decedent in his will may provide for different personal
representatives in the domiciliary jurisdiction and an ancillary jurisdiction. The
UPC will not -interfere with such a decision. See §§ 3-203(g), 3-611(b). This multiple
appointment will destroy to some extent the unity sought under the UPC. A
provision for different personal representatives can be implemented in the ancillary
judisdiction only by a formal appointment. See discussion Sections 5 B and C text
infra.
5'See cases cited note 16 supra.
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-108.
65d. § 3-2oi(a)(2).
MId. § 3 -201(d).
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In the proceedings brought for the appointment of a personal rep-
resentative in a non-domiciliary jurisdiction the procedures set out in
Article III, Part 3 (informal appointment) or Part 4 (formal appoint-
ment) would be used. Those seeking the appointment of a personal
representative could choose either of the tracks, formal or informal.
5 7
B. Informal Appointment
The informal procedure, involving only the Registrar, is not avail-
able if a personal representative has been named in the domiciliary
jurisdiction. Section 3-308 provides that an application for informal
appointment must be denied if it is indicated that
the decedent was not domiciled in this state and that a personal
representative whose appointment has not been terminated has
been appointed by a Court in the state of domicile ....
This indicates that an ancillary appointment, where there is a domi-
ciliary personal representative, can be obtained only in a formal pro-
ceeding under Part 4 of the UPC.
The basic provision concerning the application for informal ap-
pointment is section 3-3o1 which includes a requirement of disclosure
of, among other things, the place of domicile of the decedent and "a
statement identifying and indicating the address of any personal rep-
resentative of the decedent appointed in this state or elsewhere whose
appointment has not been terminated."
Section 3-307, dealing with informal appointment, includes a pro-
viso that
if the decedent was a non-resident, the Registrar shall delay the
order of appointment until 3o days have elapsed since death
unless the personal representative appointed at the decedent's
domicile is the applicant, or unless the decedent's will directs
that his estate be subject to the laws of this state.
This provision, that a domiciliary personal representative can be ap-
pointed an ancillary personal representative through the informal
procedure, seems inconsistent with section 3-308 which states that in-
formal appointment is not available for a non-domiciliary decedent
where a personal representative has been named in the state of domi-
cile. A state adopting the Uniform Probate Code would probably wish
to resolve this apparent inconsistency by either (1) dearly allowing an
informal appointment under section 3-308 if the domiciliary personal
representative is the applicant, or (2) deleting the exception for the
domiciliary personal representative in section 3-307. It would seem
DId. § 4.27.
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that the first alternative is preferable. If a domiciliary personal repre-
sentative is the applicant, there would seem to be little reason for re-
quiring a formal proceeding.
The notice provided in the informal appointment of a personal
representative includes notice to all persons having a prior or equal
right to appoint. The priority concerning appointment is established
by section 3-2o3 and this includes in (g) the following:
A personal representative appointed by a court of the decedent's
domicile has priority over all other persons except where the
decedent's will nominates different persons to be personal rep-
resentatives in this state and in the state of domicile. The domi-
ciliary personal representative may nominate another, who shall
have the same priority as the domiciliary personal representa-
tive.
Therefore, anyone seeking an ancillary appointment where there is a
domiciliary personal representative would be required, by this section,
to notify the latter of the applicant's intention to seek an informal ap-
pointment. As indicated above, this informal appointment would be
proper only if there is no known domiciliary personal representative.
C. Formal Appointment
In the typical estate where there is a domiciliary personal repre-
sentative recourse would (absent the change suggested above) be to the
appointment of an ancillary personal representative through the formal
proceeding involving a judge. Notice under section 3-403 must be
given to
executors named in any will that is being, or has been, probated,
or offered for informal or formal probate in the [county], or that
is known by the petitioner to have been probated, or offered for
informal or formal probate elsewhere, and any personal repre-
sentative of the decedent whose appointment has not been
terminated.
So here, as in the case of informal appointment, notice must be given
to the domiciliary personal representative if there is one.
The appointment in the formal proceeding is provided for in
section 3-414. Reference in that section is made to the priority estab-
lished by section 3-203 which gives preference to the domiciliary per-
sonal representative. Here, as in the informal ancillary appointment,
preference is given to the domiciliary personal representative in an




Once the ancillary personal representative has been named, the pro-
visions of Article III control and the administration follows the gen-
eral pattern established by that article.58 There are, however, some
special provisions for ancillary administrations dealing with excep-
tional problems which may arise.
The UPC attempts to minimize conflicting adjudications where
assets are located in more than one state. To this end, section 3-408
provides that an adjudication in the court of the state of domicile
determining testacy, the validity or construction of a will, made
in a proceeding involving notice to and an opportunity for con-
test by all interested persons must be accepted as determinative
by the courts of this state ....
By so applying the concept of res judicata/preclusion the UPC again
emphasizes the unity of the estate administration. Recognizing that
some jurisdictions may not provide for the probating of a will, sec-
tion 3-4o9 provides in part:
A will from a place which does not provide for probate of a
will after death, may be proved for probate in this state by a
duly authenticated certificate of its legal custodian that the
copy introduced is a true copy and that the will has become
operative under the law of the other state.
This procedure, of course, does not rise to the level of the binding
effect of section 3-408 where a will has been established. It does,
however, provide a simple method of proving the document.
Where an ancillary personal representative has been named, other
than the domiciliary personal representative, there may be a desire
to unify the administration by having the domiciliary personal repre-
sentative named in the ancillary jurisdiction. Section 3-611 (b) states
in its last sentence:
Unless the decedent's will directs otherwise a personal repre-
sentative appointed at the decedent's domicile, incident to se-
curing appointment of himself or his nominee as ancillary per-
sonal representative, may obtain removal of another who was
appointed personal representative in this state to administer
local assets.
Under this a domiciliary personal representative can oust any person
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During the course of the administration of the estate in the ancil-
lary jurisdiction, the personal representative is under an obligation to
notify creditors of his appointment.59 Under the UPC the non-claim
period, that time during which creditors must present their claims or
else be barred, is four months, which runs from the date of the notice.60
In the case of ancillary administration a serious problem arises where
notice to creditors is given at different times in different jurisdictions.
The problem of different statutes of limitations and different non-
claims periods gave the draftsmen of the UPC a great deal of trouble.
The final draft provides that any claims against the decedent's estate
arising prior to the decedent's death are barred unless presented within
the four-months' period, with the proviso that "claims barred by the
non-claim statute at the decedent's domicile before the first publica-
tion for claims in this state are also barred in this state .. .."61 So if the
non-claims provision has run in the domiciliary jurisdiction before the
first advertisement in the ancillary administration, claims will be
barred in both jurisdictions. This may seem to be unfair to the local
creditor who has relied on the assets of the decedent available in the
local state. However, he does have the right to initiate administration
2
and should do so to protect himself if it is not started promptly by
those with superior priority.
If the first advertisement in the ancillary state should occur before
the running of the non-claim period in the domiciliary jurisdiction,
then claims are not barred. Some interesting possibilities may occur
under this section. Assuming that a domiciliary personal representa-
tive has been appointed, knowledgeable creditors will file in the domi-
ciliary administration. Should there be, however, uncertainty about a
group of creditors, an attempt might be made to extend the period for
filing by starting an ancillary administration and thus taking advantage
of section 3-8o3(i).
A creditor, with sixth priority forty-five days after the death of the
decedent, 63 can seek an appointment as a personal representative. This
would have to be in a formal proceeding.64 The creditor could attempt
to time his appointment to come close to the end of the four-months'
non-claim period in the domiciliary jurisdiction. A vindictive creditor
591d. § 3-801.
'd- § S-8o3(1).
"This provides for three published notices at weekly intervals in a newspaper
of general circulation in the county.
62UNFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-2o3(a)(6).
eId.
O'Since a domiciliary personal representative has been named. See discussion
at Section 5 C text supra.
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could thus effectively extend the non-claim period for somewhat less
than four months giving creditors who were unascertained or uncer-
tain an additional period of time in which to file. This, of course, as-
sumes the existence of assets of the decedent in the ancillary jurisdic-
tion.
In the administration of the estate in the ancillary jurisdiction, the
personal representative must recognize that "[a]ll assets of estates being
administered in [the ancillary state] are subject to all claims, allow-
ances and charges existing or established against the personal repre-
sentative wherever appointed." 65 Should the assets in the domiciliary
jurisdiction prove to be insufficient to pay homestead allowance, or
family allowance, or exempt property allowance, then the assets in the
ancillary jurisdiction would be used to make up the difference.
E. Insolvent Estate
The troublesome problem of the estate which is insolvent in a
single state while solvent in other states has not been satisfactorily
settled in the general provisions of the UPG. In the First Tentative
Draft of the Model/Uniform Probate Code, dated July, 1966, in Part
III, section 317, there was a provision dealing with an "insolvent
estate transferred to federal bankruptcy court." This provision was
included in section 3-i 12 of the Honolulu Draft, 1967, in the following
language:
Incident to a petition for supervised administration, if it
appears that the estate is insolvent, the court may, upon peti-
tion of the principal creditor or creditors, order the proceedings
transferred to the jurisdiction of the federal district court in
bankruptcy, provided federal laws permit such court to ad-
minister an insolvent decedent's estate, and provided, further,
that the rights of the surviving spouse and children of the de-
cedent to homestead, family, and support allowances and to
exempt property, are or can be protected in the process.
In the UPC there is no such provision concerning an insolvent estate.
Section 3-815, however, does cover the payment of claims in case of in-
solvency. Under this section the family exemptions and allowances and
prior charges are to be satisfied, and then all claimants whose claims
have been allowed "either in this state or elsewhere in administrations
of which the personal representative is aware" are to be paid equal
proportions of his claim. The local jurisdiction in its distribution is
authorized to balance out inequitable treatment given in another
e UNIFORN1 PROBATE CODE § 3-815(a).
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state.60 Section 3-815(c) sets forth a procedure to be used in a non-
domiciliary jurisdiction when local assets available for the payment of
claims are either greater than or smaller than necessary to pay the
correct proportional share. If assets beyond the proper proportional
share are available locally, these are to be transferred to the domiciliary
personal representative. 67 Again, the unity theory which runs through
this entire Code in its treatment of multi-state estates can be seen. The
ancillary administraion does not stand apart from the domiciliary ad-
ministration; rather the two are considered together.
F. Final Distribution
The provision concerning the final distribution of the estate in the
ancillary jurisdiction also reflects the unity concept. This section, 3-
816, provides:
The estate of a non-resident decedent being administered by a
personal representative appointed in this state shall, if there is
a personal representative of the decedent's domicile willing to
receive it, be distributed to the domiciliary personal representa-
tive for the benefit of the successors of the decedent ....
There are, however, exceptions to this general provision. First, if the
decedent's will provides that his successors are to be identified "pur-
suant to the local law" of the forum state then the transfer of funds
need not be made. Second, if according to the applicable choice of
laws rules, the successors are to be determined "pursuant to the local
law of [the forum state] without reference to the local law of the de-
cedent's domicile." One obvious application of this exception would
be in the case of real property located in the forum state. Under the
usual conflicts rule this property will pass according to the law of the
state of situs-the forum state-and therefore the property would not
be distributed to the domiciliary personal representative. The appar-
ent reasoning is that if the law of the forum state is to be applied, the
forum state should apply it.
A third exception to the transfer of funds to the domiciliary jur-
isdiction occurs when the local personal representative is unable to dis-
cover a domiciliary personal representative. If he cannot find a
domiciliary personal representative through "reasonable inquiry," he
has no duty to transfer funds. Finally, a court in a proceeding for
6MId. § 3-815(b).
61d. § 3-815(c). This section was derived from the UNIFORM ANCILLARY AD-




closing under section 3-iodi, or in a supervised administration, can
order local distribution or make any other order regarding distribution
which it feels appropriate. 68
6. JURISDICTION OVER ANCILLARY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
Section 3-602 provides:
By accepting appointment, a personal representative submits
personally to the jurisdiction of the Court in any proceeding
relating to the estate that may be instituted by any interested
person.
This section also sets out the procedure to be used in serving notice
on the personal representative. By using the procedure set forth, service
can be made on any personal representative, domiciliary or ancillary,
named by a court of the state. Since there is a substantial contact be-
tween the individual and the state there would seem to be no constitu-
tional question about the validity of the provision for service.69
7. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
Section 4-301 is designed to deal with the foreign personal repre-
sentative who has not been appointed a local representative by the
local court. The foreign personal representative who (I) collects funds
as authorized by section 4-201, (2) files his authenticated copies of his
appointment thereby getting all the powers of a local personal repre-
sentative, or (3) does any act as a personal representative which would
give the state jurisdiction over him as an individual, submits to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the local state. 70 In the case of collection
of funds, jurisdiction is "limited to the money or value of personal pro-
perty collected." 71
In all of these situations there seems to be a sufficient minimum
contact so that it is reasonable for the state to exercise jurisdiction
over the foreign personal representative.
72
6UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-1OO(a).
®McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
I'°UNFORM PROBATE CODE § 4-301. Only a domiciliary personal representative
can file authenticated copies of his appointment under section 4-204. Collecting
funds under section 4-201 can be done only by a domiciliary personal representa-
tive; either a domiciliary or an ancillary personal representative could do acts in
the state which might give the state jurisdiction over "him as an individual" thus
giving the state jurisdiction over the personal representative.
72Id. § 4-301.
'See cases cited note 69 supra.
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The UPC also provides in section 4-302, that "a foreign personal
representative is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state
to the same extent that his decedent was subject to jurisdiction im-
mediately prior to death." This provision covers the situation, for
example, where the decedent, involved in an automobile accident out-
side the state of his residence, tortiously injured another person and
died. Had the tortfeasor lived, the injured person would have been
able to bring an action under the usual non-resident motorist provi-
sion. 73 Because of the death of the tortfeasor, a rather complex legal
problem arises. Some states have held that they could not exercise jur-
isdiction over the person of the foreign personal representative even
though he had been served in the forum state or had appeared in the
proceeding. The theory seems to be that the person qua personal repre-
sentative can be found only in the state of appointment and that
only the courts of that state have any power over him. 74 The federal
court sitting in Iowa, speaking to this point, stated:
[A]n executor or administrator appointed in one state, cannot
by voluntary appearance in an action in another state confer
upon the court of such other state jurisdiction to render judg-
ment against him in his representative capacity where there is
no property belonging to the estate in the state where the action
is brought.75
The court concluded that the Iowa provision for service on the for-
eign personal representative was invalid and that the court acquired
no jurisdiction over the foreign administration. 7 Although there is
some question about this judgment,77 the Iowa General Assembly de-
cided to use a different technique to reach assets of the non-resident
motorist who is deceased.
78
73Jox, Non-Resident Motorists Service of Process Acts, 33 F.R.D. 151 (1964).
7vThorburn v. Gates, 225 F. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Burton v. Williams, 63 Neb.
431, 88 N.W. 765 (19o) (foreign personal representative could not be sued in
Nebraska); State ex rel. Scott v. Zinn, 74 N.M. 224, 392 P.2d 417 (1964) (Texas
personal representative not subject to suit in New Mexico). For a good discussion
of the possibility of suing foreign personal representative see Note, Amenability
of Foreign Administrators to Suit Under Non-Resident Motorist Statutes, 57
YALE L.J. 647 (1948).
7Knoop v. Anderson, Vp F. Supp. 832, 845 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
78Id. at 852.
WSee Brooks v. National Bank of Topeka, 251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1958) (contra
to the Knoop case); In re Estate of Fagin, 246 Iowa 496, 5o4, 66 N.W.2d 920, 925 n.1
(1954) (Mulroney, J., dissenting). See also Note, Amenability of Foreign Administra-
tors to Suit !Under Non-Resident Motorist Statutes, 57 YALE L.J. 647, 653-54 (1948);
Note, Should Iowa Again "Reach Out" for Estate Representatives of Nonresident
Motorists?, 44 IOWA L. REV. 402 (1959); 36 IoWA L. REV. 128 (1950).
78See IOWA CODE § 321.512 (1966).
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The more numerous group of states has decided that a state can
exercise jurisdiction over the non-resident tortfeasor's personal repre-
sentative named by another state. This is the path chosen by the
UPC.7 9
The UPC, if adopted in the state of domicile of the deceased tort-
feasor, would give the personal representative the right to defend
when so served. Section 3-715 provides that a personal representative
(here of the deceased tortfeasor) may "(22) prosecute or defend claims,
or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of the estate and
of the personal representative in the performance of his duties." Sec-
tion 3-703(c) also provides:
A personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this state
at his death has the same standing to sue and be sued in the
courts of this state and the courts of any other jurisdiction as
his decedent had immediately prior to death. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
This provision, being tied to the status of the decedent prior to death,
is the complementing provision to that dealing with service on the
personal representative under conditions when the decedent could
have been reached immediately prior to death.
The mechanics of service are covered by section 4-303 which states:
(a) Service may be made upon the foreign personal representa-
tive by registered or certified mail, addressed to his last known
address, requesting a return receipt signed by addressee only.
Notice by ordinary first class mail is sufficient if registered or
certified mail service to the addressee is unavailable.
Service may be made upon a foreign personal representative
in the manner in which service could have been made under
other laws of this state on either the foreign personal representa-
tive or his decedent immediately prior to death.
The foreign personal representative so served is to be given at least
thirty days in which to move or appear.8 0
8. EFFECT OF ADJUDICATION; UNITY OF ADMINISTRATION
The final section of Article IV provides:
A prior adjudication rendered in any jurisdiction for or against
any personal representative of the estate is as conclusive as to
the local personal representative as if he were a party to the
adjudication.8 1
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This general statement of res judicata/preclusion in connection with
the administration of the estate is still another part of the general
attempt to unify the estate administration. This not only provides that
adjudications in the domiciliary jurisdiction will be preclusive; it also
provides that an adjudication in any other ancillary administration
will be binding. This binding effect includes both issue preclusion
and claim preclusion.82 Although there is no fraud exception specific-
ally set out, it is obvious that an adjudication resulting from fraud or
collusion would not be binding.83
9. THRUST OF PROVISIONS
An examination of the provisions of Article IV indicates that the
draftsmen have hoped to achieve some very specific ends. First is simpli-
city in the handling of the assets of the estate outside the domiciliary
jurisdiction. Second is the unifying of the administration to avoid
conflicting fiduciaries or, more positively, to simplify and expedite
administration. Third is the goal of centralizing all of the problems in
the domiciliary administration by allowing suits against the domicili-
ary personal representative in a number of jurisdictions. The unifying
of administration is promoted, finally, by the res judicata/preclusion
effect to be given adjudications "in any jurisdiction for or against any
personal representative of the estate."
All of these attempts of the draftsmen-to simplify, to unify the ad-
ministration, to centralize the problems of the estate-if successful will
make estate administration a much more attractive way of handling
the passage of property from one generation to another.8 4 In the multi-
state estate provisions of the UPC, the draftsmen have presented a
document which deserves the careful consideration of the legal pro-
fession.
uSee generally Vestal, Extent of Claim Preclusions, 54 IowA L. REv. 1 (1968);
Vestal, Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion: Judgment for the Claimant, 62 Nw. U.L.
REv. 357 (1967); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Nature of the Con-
troversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158; Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties,
50 IOWA L. REv. 27 (1964).
H"here is an overriding fraud provision in UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-106.
"'Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoid-
ance, 44 IND. L.J. 191 (1969).
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